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I. 
8TATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to §§ 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86 and 63-46B-16, Utah Code 
Ann. 1953, as amended. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the Industrial Commission err in not finding the 
Uninsured Employer's Fund liable along with the statutory 
employer L & T Construction and its insurance carrier the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah for a portion of the workers' 
compensation benefits awarded Mr. Fulton as is required by §35-1-
107 U.C.A.? (Attached as Appendix 1) 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is a correction of error standard 
without deference to the decision of the administrative agency 
when "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) & 
(h)(iv) Utah Code Ann.; Morton International, Inc., v. Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991); Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CA8E AND CITATIONS TO THE RECORD SHOWING THAT 
THE ISSUES WERE PRESERVED BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Industrial Commission of Utah awarded workers 
compensation benefits to the applicant, Chad 0. Fulton 
(hereinafter "Fulton") for injuries he suffered when he fell from 
a roof while in the course of his employment for Kim Kennedy dba 
Kennedy Roofing (Uninsured) (hereinafter "Kennedy"). (See 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, R. 62-68 attached 
as Appendix 2 hereto; and Order Granting Motion for Review, R. 
78-82 attached as Appendix 3 hereto.) The parties on appeal do 
not contest the award of benefits. Rather the parties contest 
which of them is responsible for those payments and in what 
proportion they are responsible. The applicant below, Fulton, is 
not a party to the appeal. While the issues among the parties 
are being determined the petitioner, Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah (hereinafter "WCF"), the workers compensation insurance 
carrier for the statutory employer L & T Enterprises, Inc. 
(hereinafter "L & T") is advancing payment of compensation 
benefits. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Fulton, was injured on June 11, 1992, when he fell from the 
roof of a building while working for Kennedy. Fulton filed an 
Application For Hearing October 17, 1992, claiming entitlement to 
workers compensation benefits. He listed Kennedy Roofing, Jay 
Harris and L & T as employers. A notation was made that "All 
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contractors appear uninsured". (R. 2) The Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah answered on behalf of L & T with a general denial. 
WCF alleged that L & T was not the employer. WCF further alleged 
that Fulton was the employee of independent subcontractor(s). 
WCF relied on the 1988 amendments to §35-1-42 U.C.A. (R. 59) 
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on April 29, 1993. (R. 
61, R. 13 0-179) At the hearing evidence was presented regarding 
employee/employer relationship issues. Following the hearing, 
the administrative law judge entered his Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Order on May 5, 1993. (Appendix 2 
hereto.) Applying the facts to the law, the administrative law 
judge found: 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The applicant sustained a compensable 
industrial accident on July 11, 1992, while 
employed by Kim Kennedy dba Kennedy 
Roofing/Total Construction/Norric 
Enterprises/Norman King. In addition, the 
applicant was also employed on July 11, 1992, 
by the statutory employer, L & T Enterprises, 
Inc. 
(R. 65). 
Because all of the direct employers were uninsured and 
apparently impecunious and unable to pay the compensation 
benefits, the administrative law judge ordered WCF to pay the 
compensation benefits to Fulton on behalf of L & T Enterprises. 
Pursuant to §35-1-107 U.C.A, the judge further ordered: 
...that the Uninsured Employers Fund shall 
reimburse the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah for 50% of the benefits paid by Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah on behalf of the 
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applicant as the result of the industrial 
accident of July 11, 1992. 
(R. 66) 
The Uninsured Employer's Fund (hereinafter "UEF") filed a 
Motion for Review on June 4, 1993, arguing the following: 
1. The issue is one of statutory construction of §35-
1-107 U.C.A.; 
2. The statutory employer should be responsible for 
100% of the benefits because in UEF's interpretation of §35-1-107 
U.C.A., the role of the UEF is as a fund of last resort or 
"safety net" in the event all employers and statutory employers 
are uninsured and insolvent. (R. 69-74) 
L & T and WCF filed a responsive letter supporting the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the 
administrative law judge on July 7, 1993. (R. 76) 
C Disposition bv the Industrial Commission 
The Industrial Commission entered its Order Granting Motion 
for Review on June 28, 1994. The Commission adopted the 
administrative law judge's Findings of Fact including the finding 
that L & T was Fulton's statutory employer but made different 
conclusions of law based on those facts. The Commission 
concluded: 
The Commission disagrees with the ALJ's 
application of [§35-1-107 U.C.A.]. The 
statute imposes liability on the UEF only in 
those cases where an injured employee's 
employer is uninsured and insolvent...In this 
case, Fulton had two employers; Kennedy and L 
& T. . . 
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While Kennedy is uninsured and insolvent, L & 
T is neither uninsured nor insolvent. 
Therefore, because L & T is Fulton's employer 
and is able to pay workers' compensation 
benefits, the provisions of §35-1-107(1) are 
not triggered and UEF is not obligated to pay 
any of Fulton's benefits. 
(R. 78-81 and Appendix 3) 
By Petition for Writ of Review (R. 83-85) and Docketing 
Statement (R. 88-106), both filed July 14, 1994, L & T and WCF 
bring this matter to the Court of Appeals for an interpretation 
of §35-1-107 U.C.A. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACT8 
The Industrial Commission of Utah adopted as its own the 
Findings of Fact of the administrative law judge. (R. 78) Those 
facts are not in dispute. However, the application of those 
facts to the statutory law is in dispute. Reference to the facts 
will primarily be those cited by the administrative law judge. 
We will not further cite to the Record on Appeal unless the fact 
is not one contained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order. (R. 62-68 & Appendix 2 hereto). 
1. The applicant below, Chad O. Fulton, sustained a 
compensable industrial injury on July 11, 1992, when he fell 
fifty to sixty feet from a roof on which he was working. Shortly 
prior to his injury, Mr. Fulton was hired by defendant Jay C. 
Harris who represented himself to be a roofing foreman to do 
roofing work on a project for defendant Kim Kennedy dba Kennedy 
Roofing. Defendant Kennedy Roofing was a subcontractor for 
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petitioner L & T Enterprises which was the general contractor of 
the project on which Mr. Fulton was injured. 
2. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on April 29, 1993. 
The administrative law judge entered his Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Order on May 5, 1993. Applying the facts 
to the law, the administrative law judge found the following: 
A. Chad 0. Fulton was an employee of defendant Kim 
Kennedy dba Kennedy Roofing/Total Construction/Norric 
Enterprises/Norman King (uninsured) (Hereinafter "Kennedy"). Mr. 
Fulton was also a statutory employee of petitioner L & T 
Enterprises, Inc. No party contests that L & T is the "statutory 
employer" of Mr. Fulton; 
B. Defendant Kennedy is jointly responsible with 
petitioner Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah (Hereinafter "WCF") 
for the payment of compensation benefits to Mr. Fulton; 
C. The WCF is to pay the benefits in the first 
instance subject to being reimbursed 50% from the Uninsured 
Employers7 Fund; 
D. The Uninsured Employers' Fund has full rights of 
subrogation for the benefits it pays from Kennedy and the 
principals associated therewith. 
3. UEF filed its Motion for Review (R. 69-74) on June 4, 
1993, arguing the following: 
A. The issue is one of statutory construction of §35-
1-107 U.C.A.; 
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B. The statutory employer (L & T) should be 
responsible for 100% of the death benefits because in UEF's 
interpretation §35-1-107 U.C.A. the role of the UEF is as a fund 
of last resort or "safety net" in the event all employers and 
statutory employers are uninsured and insolvent. 
4. L & T and WCF filed a response asserting their support 
of reasoning contained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order. (R. 76) 
5. The Industrial Commission entered its Order Granting 
Motion for Review (R. 78-82 and Appendix 3 hereto) on June 28, 
1994, in which: 
A. The Commission adopted the administrative law 
judge's Findings of Fact but made different conclusions of law 
based on those facts. 
B. The Commission found UEF is not liable for any 
portion of the benefits. Essentially the Commission found that 
§35-1-107 U.C.A. which creates UEF is a fund of last resort to 
pay compensation benefits only if there is no employer or 
statutory employer solvent to pay those benefits. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In 1984, the Utah Legislature enacted §35-1-107 U.C.A. which 
established the Uninsured Employees Fund. The purpose of the 
Uninsured Employer's Fund was originally limited to being the 
last resort payer of compensation benefits to injured employees 
whose employers had failed to buy workers compensation insurance 
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and were otherwise financially incapable of paying the benefits. 
Funds for the UEF are provided through a premium tax paid by the 
State's insurance carriers which write workers compensation 
insurance. The UEF is administered by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. 
An argument was made in 1987 in the case of Jacobsen v. 
Industrial Com'n of Utah, infra., that the Uninsured Employer's 
Fund should either share or pay all of the benefits in situations 
when the actual employer is uninsured and there is a "statutory 
employer". The Court of Appeals ruled UEF was not liable for 
payments because the statute provided that its responsibility 
began only "...when every employer of the claimant..." including 
statutory employers were uninsured and insolvent. 
Because of the perceived unfairness to innocent "statutory 
employers", joint employers and their insurance carriers having 
to pay for uninsured employers' failures, the Legislature took 
little time in reacting to the Jacobsen case. In 1988, §35-1-107 
was amended eliminating the word "every" on which the Court had 
relied in Jacobsen. The Legislature also added the phrase that 
the UEF is to "...assist in the payment...if the person's 
employer is individually, jointly, or severally liable..." UEF 
is therefore obligated to share the responsibility. That 
accomplishes the beneficent intent of the Legislature to spread 
among all insurance carriers the costs of protecting the State's 
workers from unscrupulous or negligent employers' failures to 
provide coverage. 
8 
Herein, the Industrial Commission overruled the 
administrative law judge's well thought out opinion which found 
UEF partially responsible to pay benefits. Because Fulton's 
direct employer Kennedy is uninsured and apparently impecunious, 
the responsibility is on UEF to "assist in the payment" of the 
benefits to Fulton. The administrative law judge's determination 
that the UEF share with the Workers Compensation Fund equally in 
the payment of benefits in the event Kennedy is unable to pay 
should be reinstated. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND HAS AN OBLIGATION TO PAY 
A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE COMPENSATION BENEFITS WHEN 
THE INJURED OR DECEASED EMPLOYEE HAS JOINT EMPLOYERS OR 
A STATUTORY EMPLOYER AND ONE OR MORE OF THOSE EMPLOYERS 
IS UNABLE TO "COVER [ITS] WORKERS COMPENSATION 
LIABILITIES".1 
This is not the first time the issue of UEF responsibility 
to pay compensation benefits in joint employment situations has 
been presented to the Court of Appeals. In Jacobsen v. 
Industrial Com'n of Utah. 738 P.2d 658 (Utah App. 1987) the Court 
was asked to consider whether the statutory employer and UEF 
should share in the payment of benefits when the actual employer 
was uninsured and unable to do so. At that time §35-1-107(1), 
1986 stated UEF: 
. . . h a s the purpose of paying and assuring, t o 
persons e n t i t l e d to workers' compensation 
b e n e f i t s when every employer of the claimant 
l
. §35-1-107(1) U.C.A., 1990* See the e n t i r e current version of the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund enabling s t a t u t e as Appendix 1 hereto . 
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who is found to be individually, jointly, or 
severally liable...does not have sufficient 
funds, insurance, sureties, or other security 
to cover workers' compensation liabilities 
under this chapter. 
(Emphasis added.) The Court emphasized that the word "every" was 
the controlling feature of the statute. The reasoning of the 
Court was essentially that as long as any entity or individual in 
a workers' compensation employer relationship with the injured 
employee is capable of paying the benefits, UEF has no 
responsibility. 
In a direct response to the Jacobsen decision, the 
Legislature amended §35-1-107(1) in 1988 by eliminating the word 
"every" upon which the Jacobsen Court relied. At the time of the 
accident in question and currently the statute reads in pertinent 
part: 
...The fund has the purpose of assisting in 
the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
to any person entitled to them, if that 
person's employer is individually, jointly, 
or severally liable to pay the benefits, but 
...does not have sufficient funds...to cover 
workers' compensation liabilities... 
(Emphasis added.) (See Appendix 1 for the complete text.) This 
Court must consider that the Legislature made the above changes 
advisedly. The term "assisting in the payment" can only 
contemplate that UEF has the obligation to "assist" some other 
person or entity making compensation benefits. The elimination 
of the word "every" makes it clear that UEF must assist those in 
any sort of workers' compensation employer relationship even if 
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they are capable of paying the benefits because of having 
insurance coverage or qualifying as self-insureds. 
The good sense of this sort of cost spreading is borne out 
when one considers how UEF is financed. Every workers 
compensation insurance carrier in the State, including WCF, pays 
a premium tax assessed by the Industrial Commission of Utah. A 
portion of the dollars so generated is dedicated to funding UEF. 
§59-9-102(2)(a) & (b) U.C.A. Therefore, in reality, this is a 
method for insurance carriers and employers to spread the risk of 
being found secondarily or jointly responsible for paying 
compensation benefits to cover employers who fail to comply with 
the statutory requirement to provide for their employees. In 
other words, it prevents an unfair burden on one employer or 
insurance carrier in joint responsibility situations. 
The Uninsured Employees Fund takes the position that it is 
only secondarily liable and that [UEF] only has liability in the 
event that the statutory employer and the uninsured employer are 
unable to pay benefits. That argument totally disregards the 
1988 amendment which removed the word every from that statute. 
The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from that change is 
that the Legislature intended to overcome the effects of the 
decision in Jacobsen v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Workers' Compensation Act of Utah has as one of its 
purposes to have industry pay the costs of unfortunate accidents 
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which befall its employees. The Act does that by spreading the 
liability among all employers by requiring them to obtain workers 
compensation insurance. (The sole exception to that is for the 
very largest employers who meet the Commission's criteria to 
qualify as self-insureds.) That makes it possible for the small 
and medium sized employers such as L & T to continue in business 
even when the unfortunate catastrophic accident occurs. The 
Legislature recognized that in some circumstances employers will 
not obey the law to procure insurance. In such an instance, 
prior to the passage of §35-1-107 U.C.A., the injured employee 
was left without benefits. 
§35-1-107 U.C.A. established the Uninsured Employer's Fund 
to pay those benefits. Financing for the Uninsured Employer's 
Fund is obtained by means of a premium tax assessed to all self-
insureds and insurance carriers which write such compensation 
policies. That places the burden for defaulting employers back 
on industry where it belongs. 
After a few years of experience with that system, the 
Legislature recognized that "statutory employers," joint 
employers and/or their insurance carriers could be hit with a 
significant liability in the event common law and/or coemployers 
fail to obtain compensation insurance. A catastrophic accident 
could significantly impact the business viability of such 
entities. Therefore, in 1988, the Legislature amended §35-1-107 
U.C.A. to make it clear that UEF should share that 
responsibility. The effect is again to place more of the risk on 
12 
industry as a whole and not focus it on an innocent statutory 
employer which had complied with the law. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah fails to recognize the 
Legislature's intent. Because Fulton's direct or common law 
employer is uninsured and incapable of paying his share, the 
Uninsured Employer's Fund should fulfill its purpose and pay a 
proportionate share to offset Kennedy's failure to procure 
workers compensation insurance as required by law. This Court 
should reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission and 
remand the case to the Industrial Commission to reinstate the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the 
administrative law judge. 
DATED this \1 day of January, 1995. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
By: 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Co-Counsel for L & T 
Enterprises, Inc. and Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
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T a b l 
APPENDIX 1 
SECTION 35-1-107, U.C.A., AMENDED 1988 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-107 
History: R.S. 1933, 42-1-97a, enacted by 
L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-l-97a. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 92 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Statutes «=» 64(2). 
35-1-107, Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers* Fund. The fund has the pur-
pose of assisting in the payment of workers' compensation benefits to any 
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is individually, jointly, or 
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is insolvent, appoints or 
has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insur-
ance, sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities. 
This fund succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity 
Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is liable for all obliga-
tions of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the 
exception of penalties on those obligations. 
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided under Sub-
section 59-9-101 (2). The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable 
costs of administration may be paid from the fund. The commission shall 
employ counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceed-
ings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon the 
request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or county at-
torney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under this 
title is pending, or in which the employee resides or an employer resides or is 
doing business, shall aid in the representation of the fund. 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable to 
or on behalf of an employee or the employee's dependents from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and 
benefits of the employee or the employee's dependents against the employer 
failing to make the compensation payments. 
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent 
employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The court 
with jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section a priority 
equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in the absence of 
this section against the assets of the insolvent employer. The expenses of the 
fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's 
expenses. 
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee, or liq-
uidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the cov-
ered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against the 
fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the assets 
of the insolvent employer. 
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable from the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same rights as 
allowed under Section 35-1-62. 
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(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers1 Compensation Division of 
the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting its 
own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk management 
company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and capa-
bilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims. 
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon render-
ing a decision with respect to any claim for workers' compensation benefits, 
shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value of 
the total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct that the addi-
tional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards may be 
docketed as other awards under this chapter. 
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the state trea-
surer, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, 
or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to the assets 
in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the making of 
any payment. 
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and 
payment of claims for compensation from the fund. 
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
to pay benefits under this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured 
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured 
employers amounts necessary to pay (a) the obligations of the fund subse-
quent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses of handling covered claims subse-
quent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of examinations under Subsection (12), and 
(d) other expenses authorized by this section. The assessments of each self-
insured employer shall be in the proportion that the manual premium of the 
self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year bears to the manual 
premium of all self-insured employers for the preceding calendar year. Each 
self-insured employer shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30 
days before it is due. No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an 
amount greater than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for 
the preceding calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in 
any one year an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the 
fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion 
shall be paid as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are 
liable under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the self-
insured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance 
privileges within this state. This subsection does not apply to claims made 
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior to 
July 1, 1986. 
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the industrial 
commission of any information indicating that any self-insured employer may 
be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or the 
public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, the 
industrial commission may order an examination of that self-insured em-
ployer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all self-insured 
employers as provided in Subsection (11). The results of the examination shall 
be kept confidential. 
(13) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
or by or on behalf of the employee to whom or to whose dependents compensa-
tion and other benefits are paid or payable from the fund, the burden of proof 
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is on the employer or other party m interest objecting to the claim. The claim 
is presumed to be valid up to the full amount of workers' compensation bene-
fits claimed by the employee or his dependents. This subsection applies 
whether the claim is filed in court or in an adjudicative proceeding under the 
authority of the commission. 
(14) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may not 
recover compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
if: 
(a) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43 
(3) (a); or 
(b) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) 
(a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate pay-
ment of direct compensation, which failure is attributable to an act or 
omission over which the person had or shared control or responsibility. 
(15) For purposes of Subsection (14) (b): 
(a) a partner of a partnership and an owner of a sole proprietorship are 
presumed to have had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to 
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, the 
burden of proof being on any person seeking to establish the contrary; and 
(b) evidence affirmatively establishing that a partner of a partnership 
or an owner of a sole proprietorship had or shared control or responsibility 
for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct 
compensation may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to 
the contrary. 
(16) A director or officer of a corporation may not recover compensation or 
other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund if the director or officer is 
excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) (b). 
(17) Any additional administrative burden imposed by amendments to Sub-
section 35-1-42 (5) during the 1988 general session of the Legislature may be 
funded out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund, up to a maximum of $16,000. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-107, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, $ 12; 1987, 
ch. 2, § 35; 1987, ch. 126, 5 4; 1988, ch. 109, 
* 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective July l t 1986, in Subsection (1) 
substituted "Uninsured Employers' Fund" for 
Default Indemnity Fund" wherever it ap-
pears; inserted "of the claimant who is found to 
be individually, jointly, or severally liable" be-
fore "becomes" and inserted "or is" after "be-
comes" in the first sentence, inserted the sec-
ond sentence, added "with the exception of pen-
alties on those obligations" at the end of the 
last sentence, and made minor word changes; 
in Subsection (2) added "and 31A-3-20K2)" at 
the end of the first sentence, substituted "com-
mission' for "attorney general", substituted 
employ counsel" for "appoint a member of his 
staff', added "and upon the request of the com-
mission the attorney general, city attorney, or 
county attorney of the locality in which any 
investigation, hearing, or trial under the provi-
sions of this title is pending, or in which the 
employee resides or an employer resides or is 
doing business, shall aid in the representation 
of the fund," at the end of the fourth sentence, 
and made stylistic changes; made stylistic 
changes in Subsections (3), (4), (7), and (10); in 
the first sentence of Subsection (8) deleted 
"from the Default Indemnity Fund" following 
claim," substituted "benefits" for "compensa-
tion" following "for", inserted "uninsured" be-
fore "employer" and "value of the" before 
"total", deleted "made" following "award", in-
serted "in connection with" following "in", and 
inserted "Uninsured Employers'" before 
"Fund"; and added Subsections (11) and (12). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 2, effec-
tive February 6, 1987, in Subsection (2) sub-
stituted "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 59-9-
101(2)" for "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 
31A-3-201". 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 208, effec-
tive July 1,1987, in Subsection (2), in the first 
sentence substituted "under Subsection 
31A-3-20K2)" for "pursuant to Subsections 
35-l-68-(2)(a) and 31A-3-20K2)." 
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The section was set out in 1987 as reconciled 
by the Office of Legislative Research and Gen-
eral Counsel. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, in Subsection (1), divided the former first 
sentence into the present first two sentences 
and, in the second sentence, substituted 'The 
fund has the purpose of assisting in the pay-
ment of workers' compensation benefits to any 
person entitled to them, if that person's em-
ployer is individually, jointly, or severally lia-
ble to pay the benefits, but" for "for the purpose 
of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits when every 
employer of the claimant who is found to be 
individually, jointly, or severally liable" and 
deleted "under this chapter" at the end; in Sub-
section (2), divided the former fourth sentence 
into the present last two sentences and deleted 
"the provisions o r preceding "this title" in the 
last sentence; substituted "the employees'" for 
"their" twice in Subsection (3), "with jurisdic-
tion" for "having jurisdiction" in the second 
sentence in Subsection (4) and "workers' com-
pensation benefits" for "benefits under this 
chapter" in the first sentence of Subsection (8); 
and added Subsections (13) through (17). 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 2, § 331 provides: "This act has retrospec-
tive operation to January 1, 1987." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Carlucci v. Utah State Indus. 
Comm'n & Default Indemn. Fund, 725 P.2d 
1335 (Utah 1986); Jacobean v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 738 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct App. 1987). 
CHAPTER 2 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION 
Section 
35-2-1. Short title. 
35-2-2. Act to be administered by Indus-
trial Commission. 
35-2-3. Exclusive remedy against em-
ployer, or officer, agent or em-
ployee — Accidental injuries 
within Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act excepted. 
35-2-4. Industrial Commission may sue 
or be sued — Service of process. 
35-2-5. Commission to prescribe rules 
and regulations. 
35-2-6. Claims to be filed with commis-
sion. 
35-2-7. Commission — Powers. 
35-2-8. Depositions of witnesses. 
35-2-9. Record of proceedings. 
35-2-10. Employers enumerated and de-
fined — Regularly employed — 
Independent contractors. 
35-2-11. "Employees," "workmen" and "op-
eratives" defined — Casual em-
ployment — Mining lessees and 
sublessees — Partnership mem-
bers. 
35-2-12. Construction of terms. 
35-2-13. Employer liability for compensa-
tion — Conditions when no pay-
ment to be made. 
35-2-14. Last employer liable — Excep-
tion. 
Section 
35-2-15. 
35-2-16. 
35-2-17. 
35-2-18. 
35-2-19, 
35-2-21. 
35-2-22. 
35-2-23. 
35-2-24. 
35-2-25. 
35-2-26. 
Benefits — Amounts — Perma-
nent total disability — Voca-
tional rehabilitation — Proce-
dure and payments — Tempo-
rary total disability — Death — 
Dependents — Medical, hospi-
tal and burial expenses. 
Employers to secure compensa-
tion — Ways allowed. 
Repealed. 
State department, commission, 
board, or agency to pay pre-
miums direct to insurance fund. 
35-2-20. Repealed. 
Employers' failure to comply a 
misdemeanor —- Penalty — 
False claim by employee a mis-
demeanor — Disposition of 
funds collected. 
Noncomplying employer — To 
pay compensation — Failure to 
pay. 
Docketing of award creates lien — 
Execution. 
Judgments for nonpayment of 
premiums — Preference. 
Waiting penod after disability — 
Exception as to disbursements 
and expenses. 
Occupational diseases — Proxi-
mate causation. 
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APPENDIX 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
(R. 62-68) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92-1264 
CHAD O. FULTON, 
Applicant. 
vs. 
KIM KENNEDY dba KENNEDY ROOFING 
(UNINSURED); JAY C. HARRIS 
(UNINSURED); L & T ENTERPRISES, 
INC. and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH; UNINSURED 
EMPLOYERS FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 
29, 1993, at 1:00 o'clock p.m.; same being 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law 
Judge. 
Applicant was present and represented by T. Jeffrey 
Cottle, Attorney at Law. 
Defendant, Kim Kennedy dba Kennedy Roofing 
(Uninsured) failed to appear. 
The defendant, Jay C. Harris (Uninsured) was 
present and represented Pro Se. 
L & T Enterprises and/or Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah were present and represented by Richard G. 
Sumsion, Attorney at Law. 
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by 
Thomas C. Sturdy, Attorney at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Being 
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fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is now 
prepared to enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein, Chad O. Fulton, sustained a compensable 
industrial accident on July 11, 1992. Just prior to his injury 
date, the applicant had been dating the daughter of Jay C. Harris. 
Knowing that the applicant needed work, Mr. Harris approached the 
applicant and informed him that he had been hired by Kim Kennedy, 
as the result of an ad he had seen in the Provo Herald, whereby Kim 
Kennedy was advertising himself as K. Kennedy Roofing. Mr. Harris 
informed Mr. Fulton that he had been hired by Kennedy as a roofing 
foreman and that to complete the job they were working on, they 
would require additional help, and thus the offer of employment to 
the applicant. 
On July 11, 1992, the applicant was installing roofing at an 
apartment complex called The Avenues. As the applicant was doing 
so, unfortunately, he slipped and fell from the roof approximately 
50 - 60 feet to the ground. As the result, the applicant fractured 
his pelvis in six places, collapsed a lung, and also fractured his 
left foot. He was treated at the Utah Valley Hospital. Dr. Schow, 
the applicant's treating physician released him to return to work 
effective October 1, 1992. 
The applicant also testified that he was paid by the square, 
but that he did not keep track of his output, as "I was there to 
work." He did state, however, that the number of squares that he 
had installed was being recorded by Mr. Harris. Mr. Fulton also 
testified that he never observed Mr. Kennedy on the job. 
Mr. Harris was called and testified that he had previously 
worked as a prop maker for the movie industry, but was no longer 
engaged in that occupation due to an industrial injury he sustained 
while so employed. He testified that he has roofed on and off from 
1984, and that the total time spent roofing by him was 2 - 3 years. 
He also stated that roofing contractors generally pay by the 
square. He testified that he had made the acquaintance of Mr. 
Kennedy previous to this job, and that he had worked on a project 
called the Cambridge project. After he had completed that project, 
he went on a trip to Zions National Park with his wife. When he 
returned, he contacted Kim Kennedy, and was told by Mr. Kennedy 
that his father, Vern Kennedy, had secured a roofing job with 
L & T Enterprises, that was paying $22.00 per square. Mr. Harris 
testified that he thought that he would be paid by Mr. Kennedy. 
When he went to get paid for the Cambridge job, he was told by 
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Kennedy that he should see the accountant. When he reported to the 
"accountant", he discovered that it was Norric Enterprisesf a dba 
of Norman King who also had a dba called Total Construction. Mr. 
Harris also stated that on the Avenues job, he dealt with someone 
from L & T named Kerry, who was in charge on the job site, and had 
a portable telephone. Mr. Harris went on to testify that he holds 
no contractor licenses from the state of Utah and also was not 
cited by OSHA for the accident. He did state that he furnished the 
safety equipment for himself and the applicant, but that Mr. 
Kennedy furnished all of the tools needed for the roofing. The 
materials were billed to L & T. Mr. Harris also stated that there 
was not much negotiation with respect to his dealings with roofing 
contractors. He noted that in Utah, the roofing contractors seemed 
to have the attitude that "roofers are lucky to have a job." 
The President of L & T was called and testified that L & T is 
a general contractor engaged in small commercial and residential 
construction. He also testified that L & T has thirty employees of 
its own and that when they construct a building they accomplish the 
job with their own employees or they will use subcontractors. He 
stated further that they do everything involved in the construction 
of buildings except for those areas they are not licensed in, and 
those specifically are electrical, mechanical (heating, air 
conditioning, etc.) and plumbing. He went on to testify quite 
forthrightly that they have actually done a lot of their own 
roofing, and that, in fact, they had roofers on their payroll on 
July 11, 1992. He further testified that L & T had roofers on the 
job at the Avenues project, because when the subcontractor did a 
poor job, he stated that they moved in their own roofing crew and 
they finished the job. Mr. Bankhead went on to state that they had 
signed a roofing contract with Vern Kennedy, who was described as 
an estimator for Total Construction, and that Mr. Kennedy had 
signed on behalf of Total Construction (Norman King dba Norric 
Enterprises). 
The legal issue in this case involves whether or not the 
general contractor, L & T Enterprises, Inc., was a statutory 
employer of the applicant at the time of his industrial accident. 
The applicable statutory provision is §35-1-42, subsection (5)(c) 
which provides: 
A portion of a construction project subcon-
tracted to others may be considered a part or 
process in the trade or business of the 
general building contractor, only if the 
general building contractor, without regard to 
whether or not it would need additional 
employees, would perform the work in the 
normal course of its trade or business. 
CHAD FULTON 
ORDER 
PAGE FOUR 
The facts in this matter clearly indicate that L & T 
Enterprises, Inc., would have performed the roofing work in 
question, as part of its normal course of business. Mr. Bankhead 
testified quite candidly, that not only did L & T have roofers on 
their payroll on July 11, 1992, but, in fact, when the Total 
Construction/Kennedy Roofing . . . crew did not perform satisfac-
torily on that roofing job, a roofing crew already on L & T's 
payroll was dispatched to finish the job. Based on the foregoing, 
it is clear that L & T Enterprises, Inc., was the statutory 
employer of the applicant on July 11, 1992. The applicant's actual 
employer would have been Kennedy Roofing/Total Construction/Norric 
Enterprises. ... On the date of his accident, the applicant had 
for workers compensation purposes, two employers, namely the 
statutory employer and the uninsured employer, Kennedy 
Roofing/Total Construction/Norric Enterprises. . .. Based on the 
Charles Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P2d 926 (Utah 1980), 
case, the statutory employer and the employer, in fact, are jointly 
and severally liable for the applicant's compensation benefits. 
However, in this case, the applicant's employer, in fact, was 
uninsured and has insufficient assets or sureties to satisfy their 
portion of the applicant's compensation award. Accordingly, the 
Uninsured Employers Fund, pursuant to § 35-1-107, shall step into 
the shoes of the uninsured employer and shall pay the Uninsured 
Employer Fund's share of the applicant's benefits. 
On July 11, 1992, the applicant was being paid by the square. 
The testimony of Mr. Harris indicated that the applicant and 
himself had agreed that for the week or so that the applicant had 
worked, he had earned $100.00. Accordingly, the applicant would be 
entitled to compensation for temporary total disability at the rate 
of $67.00 per week, when rounded to the nearest whole dollar. The 
applicant was temporarily and totally disabled for the period July 
12, 1992 through October 1, 1992, or a period of 11.714 weeks. 
Therefore, the applicant is entitled to an award for temporary 
total disability of $784.84. The applicant's treating physician, 
Dr. Schow, has indicated in a letter of January 28, 1993, that the 
applicant will have no residual permanent impairment due to his 
industrial accident. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant sustained a compensable industrial accident on 
July 11, 1992, while employed by Kim Kennedy dba Kennedy 
Roofing/Total Construction/Norric Enterprises/Norman King. In 
addition, the applicant was also employed on July 11, 1992, by the 
statutory employer, L & T Enterprises, Inc.. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that L & T Enterprises, Inc., and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Chad O. Fulton, compensation 
at the rate of $67.00 per week for 11.714 weeks for a total of 
$784.84, as temporary total disability resulting from the 
industrial accident of July 11, 1992. These benefits shall be paid 
in a lump sum and shall include interest of 8% per annum from 
October 2, 1992. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that L & T Enterprises, Inc., and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay T. Jeffrey Cottle, attorney 
for the applicant, the sum of $157.00 plus 20% of the interest 
awarded to the applicant for services rendered in this matter. The 
same to be deducted from the award to the applicant and remitted 
directly to his office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that L & T Enterprises, Inc., and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of the industrial accident of July 11, 1992, 
in accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of the 
Industrial Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund shall 
reimburse the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah for 50% of the 
benefits paid by Workers Compensation Fund of Utah on behalf of the 
applicant as the result of the industrial accident of July 11, 
1992. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund shall 
have full rights of subrogation for the benefits they have paid in 
this matter, said right of subrogation shall extend to Norman King 
and Kim Kennedy. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
Timothy' C./ Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified this_c 
May, 1993. 
ATTEST: 
-rL day of 
Patricia 0. Ash/by 
Commission Secretar 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on Mayc:=:^H 1993, a copy of the 
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the 
case of Chad 0. Fulton, was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Chad 0. Fulton 
1153 West 680 South 
Orem, UT 84058 
T. Jeffrey Cottle 
Attorney at Law 
387 West Center 
Orem, UT 84057 
Kim Kennedy dba 
Kennedy Roofing 
35 East 1700 South 
Orem, UT 84058 
Jay C, Harris 
1914 South Columbia Lane 
Orem, UT 84604 
L & T Enterprises, Inc. 
953 South State 
Orem, UT 84058 
Norman King 
22 East 1450 South 
Orem, Ut 84058 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Attorney at Law 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P O Box 57929 
SLC, UT 84157 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
Attorney at Law 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
Joyce Sewe11 
Administrator 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
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"Wilma Burrows ' 
Adjudication Division 
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW (R. 78-82) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CHAD O. FULTON, * 
Applicant, * 
• 
vs. * 
KIM KENNEDY dba KENNEDY * 
ROOFING; JAY C. HARRIS; L & T * 
ENTERPRISES, INC.; WORKERS' * 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH; and * 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
In this matter, the Administrative Law Judge awarded workers' 
compensation benefits to Chad Fulton. The ALJ then apportioned 
liability for Fulton's benefits among the following: Kennedy, as 
Fulton's uninsured common law employer; L & T Enterprises, as 
Fulton's statutory employer, and L & T's insurance carrier, 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah; and the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund ("UEF"). 
The parties agree that Fulton is entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits. However, UEF argues in its Motion For 
Review that it should not be held liable for any part of those 
benefits. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
ALJ's Order. In summary, L & T, as general contractor, hired 
Kennedy as a roofing subcontractor. Kennedy then employed Fulton 
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to work as a roofei on > n was injured in 
fhp course of that work. 
rim1 ALJ found j\t W.^ .T.-.. A -rirj^jLv. _. ei d,\a 
L d I1 to be Fulton'c pursuant tc §3 5-1-4 2 or 
Utah's Workers' Co the time of Falter 
accident, Kennedy - * * ^ s ' compensation coverage , *. 
Fulton. However, I & T »-ve such coverage tnrough r^ .- Workers' 
Compensation Fv.r.J « Utan. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Because Kennedy is insolvent and was uninsured at the time of 
Fulton's accident, the ALJ' apportioned Fulton's benefits between L 
& T and UEF. In doing so, the ALJ relied upon §35-1-107 of Utah's 
Workers' Compensation Act, which provides in material part: 
There is created an Uninsured uuh., „ r ^ *• * id 
has the purpose of assisting in the
 t ^ I workers 
compensation benefits to any person entitled to them, 
that person's employer is individually, jointly, 
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes . • 
insolvent 
The Commission disagrees with the ALJ's application of the 
foregoing statute. The statute imposes liability on the UEF only 
in those cases where an injured employee's employer is uninsured 
and insolvent. In Utah, an employee may have more than one 
employer, Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P, 2d 926, 928 (Utah 
1980) In this case, Fulton had two employers; Kennedy and L & T. 
The statute must be read in light of that fact. 
While Kennedy is uninsured ai l(i msuh ent ,. i u "'in i «i neither 
uninsured nor insolvent. Therefore, because L fc T is Fulton's 
employer and is able to pay workers' compensation benefits, the 
provisions of §35-1-107(1) are not triggered and UEF is not 
obligated to pay any of Fulton's benefits. 
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ORDER 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission modifies the ALJ's 
Order, found on page five of his decision, by striking paragraphs 
four and five in their entirety. The remainder of the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. It is so ordered. 
Dated this J^f day of June, 1994. 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of 
Appeals within 30 days of the date of this Order• 
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CERTili* fciL 01 MAILING 
I, Alan Hennebold, -.-r-rt-ry that I did mail by prepaid first 
class postage a copy of the ORL-ER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the 
case Of CHAD FULTON, CASE NO. 92-1264, on the ^/f7^' 
1994 to the following: 
day of June, 
T. JEFFREY COTTLE, ESQ. 
387 WEST CENTER 
OREM, UTAU •- ' 
RICHARD G, SUMSION, ESQ. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION ': *n 
P 0 BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY, 5:157 
AH\92-j.«unO 
( 
/Ian Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commis 
^ 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
CHAD FULTON 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Alan Hennebold, certify that I did mail by prepaid first 
class postage a copy of the ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the 
case of CHAD FULTON, CASE NO. 92-1264, on the ^S7*" day of June, 
1994 to the following: 
T. JEFFREY COTTLE, ESQ. 
387 WEST CENTER 
OREM, UTAH, 84057 
RICHARD G. SUMSION, ESQ. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
P 0 BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157 
k 
<33. y?4^»^,^r, £-**£*/^> 
/Ian Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
.^y. ?ef-
AH\92-1264o 
